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Abstract 
Based on a dataset of 123 economies, both developed and developing countries, this 
paper investigates the relation between exchange-rate regimes and inflation 
performance. Our results suggest that those countries with flexible exchange-rate 
regimes are characterized by higher inflation rates, while the smaller inflation rates are 
associated with fixed exchange rates and countries with intermediate regimes occupy an 
intermediate position in their records of inflation rates. These results are maintained 
when we analyze the countries by income level, except for the case of upper income 
countries, where we do not find significant differences between fixed and intermediate 
regimes in inflation performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is now generally accepted that the primary objective of central banks should be the 
maintenance of price stability. It implies avoiding both prolonged inflation and 
deflation, since price stability contributes to achieving high levels of economic activity 
and employment. 
 
Fixing the value of the domestic currency relative to that of a low-inflation country is 
one approach central banks have used to pursue price stability. The advantage of an 
exchange rate target is its clarity, which makes it easily understood by the public. In 
practice, it obliges the central bank to limit money creation to levels comparable to 
those of the country to whose currency it is pegged. When credibly is maintained, an 
exchange rate target can lower inflation expectations to the level prevailing in the 
anchor country. 
 
Although the theoretical relationships are ambiguous, evidence suggests a strong link 
between the choice of the exchange rate regime and macroeconomic performance. 
When analysing the possible relationship between inflation and the exchange rate 
regime, it is necessary to highlight a prominent feature along many studies: the causality 
of two variables in both directions. Therefore, from this perspective, we can find two 
approaches. On the one hand, some authors (Barro and Gordon, 1983; von Hagen and 
Zhou, 2005, among others) argue that low inflation helps to maintain a fixed exchange 
rate. On the other hand, some researchers (see, e. g., Dornbusch, 2001, or Giavazzi and 
Giovannini, 1989) contend that the implementation of a fixed regime can become a 
major tool to combat inflation, mainly due to the high credibility that is implicit in the 
commitment to keep a given parity. 
 
In Ghosh et al. (1996) we find quite striking figures in the latter direction. Specifically, 
these authors obtain that, once a fixed regime has been adopted in one country, it is able 
to reduce inflation within a year, on average, by 0.6%, reducing it about 0.5 percentage 
points after three years. This situation is quite different when it comes to a floating 
regime since, after a year of being implemented, the inflation rate will have been 
increased by 3%, being reduced with the passage of time. 
 
Other more skeptical authors, such as Tornell and Velasco (2000), show that the gain in 
terms of reduction in inflation cannot be entirely achieved if not accompanied by 
policies aimed to a greater fiscal discipline. They argue that no exchange-rate regime 
can be presented as the alternative to sound policies. 
 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature by providing a fresh and comprehensive 
assessment of the relation between exchange-rate regimes and inflation performance for 
a large cross-section of countries over a long sample. The key questions that guide our 
analysis are: (i) is there an optimal exchange rates to render low inflation rates?, and, 
(ii) does it depend upon the income level? Answers to these questions seem relevant as 
they have direct implications for policy makers and academic researchers. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews the empirical literature 
on exchange-rate regimes and inflation performance. Section 3 details the data. Section 
4 describes the empirical strategy and reports the results. Finally, Section 5 offers some 
concluding remarks.   
 
2. Literature review  
Empirically fixed exchange-rate regimes are associated with lower inflation rates. To 
justify this result, some authors make use of the explanation of the "inflation bias", 
based on the idea of a conflict of interest between consumers, producers and policy 
makers (see, Kydland and Prescott, 1977, and Barro and Gordon, 1983). The reason is 
as follows: salaries are set according to the inflation target announced by the central 
bank, therefore, if the level of output is below the efficient level and the central bank 
announces an inflation target of zero and the agents are surprised by inflation above the 
target, real wages will be contracted. But, if there is a credibility problem, agents correct 
their expectations and wage demands are much greater, thus generating a higher rate of 
inflation in the economy. Therefore, given the existence of a problem of information 
asymmetry is essential the signalling. In other words, what should be the most 
appropriate tool to convince the agents that the central bank will not surprise them with 
a price level above optimal? Two alternatives have been implemented in the literature. 
 
 The first one is to adopt a fixed regime, since, in this way the central bank give the 
signal of an authority with a preference for low inflation (Canavan and Tommasi 
(1997), because it requires a moderation in the growth of supply money. The second 
alternative, that has been gaining weight over the years, is an inflation targeting regime. 
Several authors (such as Calvo and Mishkin, 2003, or Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006) have 
shown that this alternative is just as good to deliver low inflation and to achieve greater 
independence and credibility in economic policy, both globally and especially in 
emerging countries. 
 
Since international comparative studies on the impact of exchange-rate regimes on key 
macroeconomic variables have excluded dollarized countries, Edwards and Magendzo 
(2003) conducted an analysis of inflation, economic growth and volatility for these 
countries. After opting a matching methodology to create the most appropriate control 
group, these authors obtain that dollarized countries have an inflation rate significantly 
lower than on non-dollarized countries. Specifically, the average difference is between 
3.4% and 5.7% per year. 
 
De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004) analyse ten countries in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEECs) during the period 1994-2002 in order to unravel whether greater exchange rate 
stability has led to lower inflation. In their econometric specification, they assume that 
inflation is explained by the exchange rate regime, but in turn, pay special attention to 
the abovementioned problem of reverse causality and, for this reason, apply the 
generalized method of moments proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to avoid 
endogeneity. Their results corroborate the fact that policy makers adopt fixed regimes 
with the belief that they can "import" the credibility and good performance of the 
country which has anchored its currency, thereby achieving lower inflation. However, 
this conclusion becomes weaker when investigating the possibility of possible structural 
changes or when extracted outliers from the sample. In a later paper, De Grauwe and 
Schnabl (2008) expanded the sample used in De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004), 
concluding that the mechanism of fixing the exchange rate is effective only when 
inflation rates are high, but once a certain level is reached, it is no longer useful for this 
particular purpose. 
 
Within the literature of the impact that the exchange-rate regime can have on the 
evolution of the price indices, there is a stream of research that states that this effect 
may be conditioned by the level of development presented by the countries. In general, 
the emerging and developing countries are characterized by having weaker institutions, 
lacking the necessary tools to carry out the appropriate operations in international 
capital markets and relying on the protection of their industries (von Hagen and Zhou, 
2005). This situation leads to argue that fixed exchange rate regimes would be powerful 
tools to curb inflation, since, according to Crockett and Goldstein (1976), there is a 
commitment of both exchange rate stability and greater responsibility in the rate at the 
money supply grows. If, however, we analyse the most developed countries, authors 
such as Calvo and Mishkin (2003) claim that by setting goals on price stability and, 
without any explicit objective for the exchange rate, these countries can perfectly 
control inflation. 
 
In an attempt to clarify the implications of fixing the exchange rate on inflation and its 
volatility, Moreno (2001) studied a group of 98 developing countries for the period 
1975-1999. The result of his research, warns that both inflation and its variability is 
much more in flexible exchange-rate regimes than in fixed exchange-rate regimes. 
 
Another paper which shows that the degree of maturity of the institutions is essential to 
understand how the performance of macroeconomic variables differs even with the 
same exchange rate regime is Husain et al. (2005). Specifically, they point out that 
developing countries achieve lower inflation regimes with fixed exchange rate rather 
than floating, both because the credibility effect and the effect due to lower discipline 
growth rate of the money supply. In contrast, emerging economies and advanced do not 
show a strong  relationship between these two variables. The argument that they offer to 
explain such disparity is again the quality of institutions and the degree of openness to 
capital markets. Unlike developing countries, where there are many more restrictions on 
access to international capital markets, emerging economies are characterized by high 
exposure to such markets. 
 
Finally, Bleaney and Francisco (2007), studying developing countries, show that fixed 
exchange-rate regimes are useful to promote price stability. Specifically, with the 
introduction of this category would get a 2.5% reduction in the rate of inflation in the 
short and up 0.5 percentage points in the long run. On the other hand, the sign of the 
dummy variable for flexibility is positive and significant for two of the five analysed 
categorizations. However, its magnitude is relatively weaker, increase the inflation rate 
by one percentage point in the short and two long-term. 
 
3. Data 
We employ data for a total of 123 countries, both developed and developing countries. 
The 123 countries are: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Congo Dem Rep, Congo Republic, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic Rep, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lao People Dem Rep, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Libya, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Romania, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, West Bank and 
Gaza, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
 
To assess inflation performance, we use the annual data for the consumer price index 
inflation, taking from the World Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI) database.  
 
Regarding the exchange rate regimes, we have used the de facto classification of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), updated to 2010 by Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
In line with previous studies, we consider three categories: fixed, intermediate and 
flexible exchange-rate regimes. 
 
Due to data availability, our sample period ranges from 1970 to 2010. Nevertheless, our 
sample covers a relevant time period characterized by relatively open and integrated 
markets over the post-Bretton Woods period. 
 
 
4. Empirical strategy and results 
4.1. Empirical strategy 
We form groups of countries at the end of each year based on the de facto “natural fine 
classification” of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), updated to December 2010 by Ilzetzki, 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), to distinguish between a wide range of de facto regimes. 
 
Starting in 1970, we recursively form groups of countries based on the de facto 
classification and we track their inflation performance. The dynamic rebalancing of 
country groups enables us to look at the average inflation behaviour of groups of 
countries with similar exchange-rate regimes.  
 
This procedure circumvents the need to assume a specific channel through which 
regime might influence inflation and naturally handles unbalanced panels of data where 
countries enter the sample at different times (or drop out of the sample, e.g., due to the 
adoption of the euro). Additionally, this approach produces results which are readily 
interpretable in terms of economic significance, since the difference in inflation 
differentials between groups directly yields an estimate of how much higher the rate of 
inflation is in countries with a given exchange-rate regime versus countries with an 
alternative one. 
 
4.2. Empirical Results  
Since our data include several time-country combinations of hyperinflations, we 
considered three statistics to evaluate the inflation performance of each group of 
countries: the median, the 20% trimmed mean and the 20% winsorised mean1. Table 1 
(Panel A) presents the results. As can be seen, those countries that adopt flexible 
exchange-rate regimes are characterized by higher inflation rates, while the smaller 
inflation rates are associated with fixed exchange rates. Countries with intermediate 
regimes occupy an intermediate position in their records of inflation rates. More 
specifically, the median annual difference in CPI inflation rates is about 211% (270% 
and 243% for winsorised and trimmed mean CPI inflation, respectively) for country 
with flexible exchange rates with respect to countries with fixed exchange rates, while 
the median annual difference in CPI inflation rates is about 115% (156% and 137% for 
winsorised and trimmed mean CPI inflation, respectively) for country with flexible 
exchange rates with respect to countries with intermediate exchange rates. A formal test 
of mean equality indicates that there are indeed highly significant differences between 
inflation rates of each group of countries, regardless the metrics used in the evaluation. 
This finding is in line with Ghost et al. (1996), Dornbusch (2001), De Grauwe and 
Schnabl (2004), among others. 
 
To assess the robustness of our results, we divide economies under study in four income 
groups using the World Bank’s classification: low income, lower middle income, upper 
middle income and high income. Given that income classifications are set each year 
based on their per capita income data, we recursively formed groups of countries based 
on the de facto and income classifications, tracking their inflation performance. Panels 
B to E in Table 1 report the results. As can be seen, we find once more that inflation 
                                               
1Note that, in contrast to the arithmetic mean, the trimmed and winsorised means are robust measures of 
central tendency because they are less sensitive to outliers.  
 
rates are significantly much higher in countries with flexible exchange-rate regimes, that 
the smaller inflation rates are associated with fixed exchange rates, and that countries 
with intermediate regimes present an intermediate position in inflation rates. We find 
that CPI inflation is much higher in lower middle income countries with flexible 
exchange rates, being the median annual difference with respect to lower middle income 
countries with fixed exchange rates about 503% (574% and 552% for winsorised and 
trimmed mean CPI inflation, respectively). The lowest inflation rates obtained for high 
income countries with fixed exchange rate regimes: 4.2473 for median CPI inflation, 
4.4036 for winsorised mean CPI inflation and 4.3518 for trimmed mean CPI inflation. 
Irrespective of the income level, we again find that countries with intermediate regimes 
occupy an intermediate position in their records of inflation rates. Nevertheless, for 
upper income countries, we do not find significant differences between fixed and 
intermediate regimes in inflation performance, even though the latter are 1.2 times the 
former regardless the metrics used in the evaluation. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
A perennial question in international economics—whether in academia or in policy 
circles—concerns the optimal choice of exchange rate regime. A large amount of 
empirical literature have analysed whether exchange-rate regimes means a major factor 
in order to explain inflation behaviour. However, the evidence is far from being 
unambiguous. 
 
Based on a dataset of 123 economies, both developed and developing countries, this 
paper has empirically investigated the relation between exchange-rate regimes and 
inflation performance. We have found that those countries with flexible exchange-rate 
regimes are characterized by higher inflation rates, while the smaller inflation rates are 
associated with fixed exchange rates and countries with intermediate regimes occupy an 
intermediate position in their records of inflation rates. This conclusion is maintained 
when we analyze the countries by income level, except for the case of upper income 
countries, where we do not find significant differences between fixed and intermediate 
regimes in inflation performance. Our results suggest that the highest CPI inflation rates 
are associated with lower middle income countries with flexible exchange rates, while 
the lowest CPI inflation rates are present in high income countries with fixed exchange 
rate regimes. Therefore, it appears that fixed exchange rates have a significant effect on 
inflation performance. 
 
We consider that our results might have some practical meaning for investors and 
policymakers, as well as some theoretical insights for academic scholars interested in 
the behaviour of exchange-rate regimes.  
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Table 1: Empirical results 
 Median Winsorised mean Trimmed mean 
Panel A: All countries 
Fixed regimes 5.3558 
(8.4425) 
5.7267      
(8.7176) 
5.5375   
 (8.5800) 
Intermediate regimes 7.7388 
(18.3712) 
8.2625     
(18.8701) 
8.0095   
(18.7976) 
Flexible regimes 16.6336 
(11.8185) 
21.1617     
(11.9807) 
19.0096   
(12.3394) 
Fixed vs. Intermediate 9.7924 
[0.0026] 
10.3172   
 [0.0020] 
10.2171  
[0.0021] 
Fixed vs. Flexible 53.3667 
[0.0000] 
67.08286    
[0.0000] 
65.0562  
[0.0000] 
Intermediate vs. Flexible 36.6575 
[0.0000] 
50.2444     
[0.0000] 
47.3614  
[0.0000] 
Panel B: Low income countries 
Fixed regimes 6.0519 
(6.5389) 
6.3573     
 (7.0431) 
6.2641   
(6.7548) 
Intermediate regimes 9.1185 
(20.4070) 
9.5350       
(19.1123) 
9.4297   
(19.6025) 
Flexible regimes 26.9351 
(8.2112) 
27.8341       
(8.5302) 
27.4676   
(8.4181) 
Fixed vs. Intermediate 8.9036 
[0.0042] 
9.4934      
[0.0031] 
9.1822  
[0.0036] 
Fixed vs. Flexible 37.5409 
[0.0000] 
40.2420     
[0.0000] 
39.0722  
[0.0000] 
Intermediate vs. Flexible 28.9626 
[0.0000] 
30.7319     
[0.0000] 
29.9103  
[0.0000] 
Panel C: Lower middle income countries 
Fixed regimes 5.4061 
(8.8666) 
5.7211      
(8.9889) 
5.6268   
(8.8973) 
Intermediate regimes 9.0728 
(17.0937) 
9.7095      
 (17.5045) 
9.4847   
(17.6838) 
Flexible regimes 32.6045 
(8.5401) 
38.5489    
(7.0507) 
36.7142   
(7.3656) 
Fixed vs. Intermediate 20.5742 
[0.000] 
22.3185    
[0.0000] 
21.6459  
[0.0000] 
Fixed vs. Flexible 49.4898 
[0.0000] 
35.5696     
[0.0000] 
38.2806  
[0.0000] 
Intermediate vs. Flexible 37.2700 
[0.0000] 
27.5401    
[0.0000] 
29.5000  
[0.0000] 
Panel D: Upper income countries 
Fixed regimes 5.4215 
(6.9562) 
5.8437       
(7.6474) 
5.7289   
 (7.4901) 
Intermediate regimes 8.9579 
(14.8808) 
10.3325      
(11.3334) 
9.9866   
(12.5957) 
Flexible regimes 29.0878 
(7.0221) 
32.8544      
(7.6119) 
32.1460  
 (7.5548) 
Fixed vs. Intermediate 12.6129 
[0.0007] 
14.3900    
[0.0003] 
14.9349  
[0.0002] 
Fixed vs. Flexible 31.5259 
[0.0000] 
37.9721    
[0.0000] 
37.3385  
[0.0000] 
Intermediate vs. Flexible 23.1272 
[0.0000] 
26.0647   
 [0.0000] 
26.2113  
[0.0000] 
 
Table 1 (continued) 
 Median Winsorised mean Trimmed mean 
Panel E: High income countries 
Fixed regimes 4.2473 
(8.2674) 
4.4036      
(8.5557) 
4.3518   
(8.4547) 
Intermediate regimes 5.0742 
(9.2179) 
5.1206      
(9.1513) 
5.1013   
(9.2041) 
Flexible regimes 7.9865 
(5.6793) 
8.5081       
(5.5316) 
8.3811   
(5.6408) 
Fixed vs. Intermediate 1.2060 
[0.2754] 
0.8893      
[0.3485] 
0.98118  
[0.3247] 
Fixed vs. Flexible 6.2377 
[0.0158] 
6.4041      
[0.0147] 
6.5661  
[0.0135] 
Intermediate vs. Flexible 3.7190 
[0.0593] 
4.2838      
[0.0436] 
4.2775  
[0.0437] 
Notes:  
In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding t-statistics based 
on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
XX vs. XX are equality tests statistics. In the square brackets bellow these tests, we report the 
associated p-values.  
 
 
 
